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Asbestos ClailDs Facility:
An Unprecedented, Private Alternative
for Dispute Resolution
by Anthony Zaccagnini

I. The Crisis
The inability of this nation's legal system
to effectively and equitably compensate the
victims of asbestos-related injuries has developed into a tragedy of catastrophic proportions. At present, there are an estimated
30,000 asbestos claims filed throughout
the United States court system.! This
number is increasing at a dramatic rate of
approximately 500 additional claims each
month. 2 Essentially, the court system is
being overwhelmed_by asbestos litigation.
This situation has led to an intense debate as to how the problem should best
be solved. It has become readily apparent
that the United States court system is illequipped to effectively resolve, in an expedient and judicious manner, the massive
amounts of asbestos litigation. The enormous number of suits presently burdening
the judicial system has led to excessive delays in dispute resolution. In the federal
court system, a claimant can expect an
average delay of three years between the
filing of his claim and the initial trial date.
As can be expected, those affected most by
the delays are those persons with the most
pressing and immediate needs- the injured
worker.

II. A Possible SolutionThe Creation of the Facility
In 1982, asbestos producers and their insurance carriers found themselves faced
with extensive disputes among themselves
over which policies were responsible for
paying particular claims. In light of pending litigation against the carriers and producers, as well as potentially enormous expenses for the defense of personal injury
law suits, representatives of both the producers and insurers began an extensive
course of negotiations in an attempt to resolve the disputes. The disputes arose over
an inherent peculiarity of the asbestos injury; that is, it may not result in an identi-

fiable injury for up to forty years after the
exposure. 3 As a result of the latency of the
injury, many of the insurers could not agree
as to which company was liable for which
producers during a specific period. Carriers who had previously insured the asbestos manufacturers held the position
that their exposure was limited only to
claims filed during the dates of coverage
and that the asbestos-related injury did not
"occur" until the symptoms had manifested themselves in the claimant. Present
carriers for the former asbestos producers
had also denied culpability. It was their
contention that the injury for which compensation is entitled occurred only upon
exposure, and thus they should not be held
liable for present claims. In an effort to resolve the major dispute among the insur-

ance carriers, they ultimately agreed to divide and contribute settlement payments
to the Facility based upon the length of
their policy coverage for each producer. 4
Finally, on June 19, 1985, the representatives of fifty asbestos manufacturers and
insurance carriers signed the final document that formalized the creation of the
Asbestos Claims Facility. The signing culminated almost three years of intense negotiations. The negotiations were chaired
by Harry Wellington, retired Dean of Yale
Law School, who directed the meeting under the auspices of the Center for Public
Resources. The intent of this joint action
by producers and carriers is to develop an
unprecedented private sector solution to
the asbestos personal injury problem. The
Wellington Agreement, as the document is
called by those familiar with the negotiations, signifies the final resolution of a
series of disputes between the former asbestos producers and their insurance carriers.
It is anticipated that the creation of the
Facility will offer a viable, voluntary alternative to the extremely costly and lengthy
litigation process. A 1984 Rand Corporation study estimated that producers and
insurers had already spent one billion dollars in compensation and legal aid expenses
over the previous ten years. 5 The study
concluded that the average claimant only
received thirty-seven cents for every dollar
spent by these same producers and carriers.6 Of course, these numbers are heavily skewed downward by the mounting
costs of legal representation on behalf of
the defendant producers, but the effect of
this misallocation of resources is felt mostly
by the injured worker. Proponents of the
Facility claim that a proper allocation of
resources, preferably through the Claims
Facility, will result in more benefits being
disbursed to the claimant. John F. Shea,
Jr., Vice-President and Claims Counsel for
Aetna Life & Casualty, has estimated that
the ultimate cost of present and future
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claims to insurers could run somewhere
between 4 and 170 billion dollars.7 The
disparity involved in this estimate is largely
due to the unpredictable nature of punitive damage awards by juries and the uncertainty of how many workers were harmfully exposed to asbestos.
Specifically, it is proposed that the Asbestos Claims Facility will:
- Provide plaintiffs with an efficient
and more equitable alternative to
the court system.
- Establish a central and predictable
forum in which to file and have
claims evaluated.
- Reduce legal costs for plaintiffs and
defendants alike by encouraging and
coordinating the handling and settlement of asbestos-related injury
claims.
- End disputes over insurance coverage by establishing a comprehensive
coverage plan to fund liabilities and
expenses in connection with asbestosrelated injuries.
- Allow producers and insurers to
manage their liabilities and to pursue realistic financial planning for
the future. S
Naturally, there are many who question
how the Facility proposes to attain these
goals. To better understand this, it is necessary to examine the Facility and the proposed claims process.

III. The Facility
The Asbestos Claims Facility is a private, nonprofit organization, incorporated
under the laws of Delaware. The membership of this corporation consists of the
forty-five named signatories of the Wellington Agreement, as well as five unnamed,
confidential signatories who have conditionally joined with an option to exercise
full membership by December, 1986. 9
The names of these confidential signatories
will only be released if they exercise their
option to join the Facility.
Assuming leadership of the Facility will
be Wade H. Coleman, former Senior VicePresident of Citicorp, who will serve as
President and Chief Executive Officer. lo
The Facility will be governed by a thirteenmember board of directors comprised
mainly of representatives from the named
producers and insurers. 11 At present, the
Facility is expected to be headquartered in
Princeton, New Jersey with a regional office in San Francisco, California. 12 Current projections estimate the Facility to be
fully staffed and operational by February,
1986. The Facility expects to employ approximately 140 people with an annual
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operations budget expected to approach
twelve to fifteen million dollars.13 Obviously, this figure does not contemplate aggregate amounts to be paid to claimants.

IV. The Claims Process
A. The Member's Liability
By signing the Wellington Agreement,
each signatory designates the Facility as its
sole representative to administer and arrange on its behalf for the evaluation, settlement, payment or defense of any claim
filed against one of its members. Generally, liability is shared among the members as dictated by a formula that has been
devised by an independent consulting
firm. The formula is based upon each producer's previous litigation experience.
The concept is to apportion to each producer a share of all liability payments and
expenses. 14 The percentage share assigned
to each producer is applied to each claim
paid by the Facility.ls It is important to
note that the percentage assigned to each
producer is based upon the entire market
share of all asbestos producers. Thus, a
member's percentage of liability is calculated on an industry-wide basis and not by
what percentage of asbestos he produced
in relation to other members. This rule reflects the Facility's general policy that it
will duly compensate a victim for the liability incurred only by its members and
not by all manufacturers of asbestos. Of
course, it is the carrier who will actually
compensate the victim, but the agreement
does stipulate that the producers will be
responsible for awards and expenses paid
to a claimant in excess of policy limits. 16

B. The Claimant's Role
Participation in the Asbestos Claims Facility is purely voluntary on the claimant's
part. It is non-binding prior to the acceptance of a settlement and does not affect
any legal rights a claimant may have against
non-members. 17 Claimants have the right,
but are not compelled, to employ their
own counsel during the claims process. IS
Counsel fees will remain a confidential
matter between the attorney and the client.
It is hoped that plaintiffs' attorneys will
take into consideration the relative ease
with which a claim can be settled and correspondingly reduce their typical one-third
share of the settlement.

C. The Standard/or Compensation
In order to have a compensable claim by
the Facility's standards an individual must
have an asbestos-related "impairment and
dysfunction" from exposure to asbestos or
asbestos-containing products of a Facility
member. 19 The basic requirement of"impairment and dysfunction" substantially
removes from the Facility those workers

who have been exposed to asbestos but do
not currently suffer from a physical impairment and disability. The level of disability is measured by pulmonary function
values, which is the standard test to determine if such impairment has occurred.
This standard has seemingly left out of
the compensation scheme those claimants
who have been diagnosed as having pleural
thickening or pleural plaques and no interstitial fibrosis. This group comprises a majority of all victims of asbestos exposure.
However, a recent development in negotiations by the Wellington Group, serving
as interim liaison counsel until the Facility
begins its operations, has given these victims some hope for future compensation.
Since September 9, 1985, the Wellington
Group has settled over twenty cases in
California, Arkansas and Texas with claimants who did not meet the "impairment
and dysfunction" standard. 20 Settlements
in these cases averaged $130,000.00 per
claimant. 21
D. The Claims Process
A claim can be filed, at no cost to the
claimant, at either the Facility's Princeton
or San Francisco office by simply filling
out a general information sheet. The basic
file requirements for claim processing are:
(a) work history, (b) dates of exposure to
asbestos-containing products, and (c) trade
names or manufacturers of the asbestoscontaining products. The Facility will
process only asbestos claims relating to
bodily injury and will not consider any
claim for workers' compensation benefits
or property damage. It should be noted
that producers and insurers are presently
re-evaluating the property damage issue,
and that eligibility for workers' compensation or other disability benefits does not affect a claimant's right to use the Facility. 22
Interestingly, the Facility will compensate
the victim for loss of consortium in appropriate cases. Furthermore, claims may be
brought to the Facility concurrently with a
court action against the Facility members.
The statute of limitations on the court
claim may be tolled as long as the claim is
in the Facility process. 23 The claimants
are free to choose between the Facility and
court system at any time prior to acceptance of a settlement or binding alternative
dispute resolution. 24
Once a claim has been filed with the Facility, an evaluation will be conducted according to pre-established guidelines by
experienced claims personnel. Essentially,
the claim will be evaluated based upon the
level of impairment and dysfunction that
is detected in relation to the level of exposure to products manufactured by Facility
members. The Facility will not compensate an injured worker for any degree of in-

jury it deems was the result of exposure to
products of non-members.25 In practical
terms, this means that if a worker's level of
impairment and dysfunction is determined
to be "X" and the Facility determines that
its members' products are responsible for
30% of the worker's injury, the settlement
offer will reflect a compensation generally
along the line of 30% of "X". In essence,
the Facility will not make the claimant
whole for his asbestos-related injury. An
injured party must still seek compensation
against non-members through the court
system.
Once a claim is evaluated, a settlement
offer will be proffered to the claimant. If
the offer is not satisfactory, the claimant
will have the opportunity to choose from a
full range of mediation and arbitration
techniques at no cost to himself. This process is called the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedure, and it is currently
being developed by the Facility in conjunction with a representative group of
plaintiffs' representatives. The ADR will
provide an array of binding and nonbinding arbitration procedures. If this process
should fail and it is determined that a final
settlement cannot be reached, the claimant
can exercise his option to return to the
court system or utilize a less expensive
process of binding dispute resolution. One
interesting aspect of the Facility that will
dramatically reduce defense costs for its
members is the current plan to retain local
counsel for all members in specific areas.
The concept is to have one defense team to
represent all of the Facility'S members in a
particular jurisdiction. 26 The practical application of this method is to reduce the
number of defense teams appearing in a
single case from an average of twenty to
just one.
To date, the Facility has refused to utilize a predetermined schedule of benefits
such as those used for workers' compensation. Instead, the Facility will evaluate
each claim separately on its merits. 27
Ideally, the voluntary nature of the Facility and the claimant's right to return to the
court system will ensure that settlement
offers are fair and reasonable. The Facility
does require that any final settlement is to
include a full release of any claim for punitive damages against its members and that
any settlement accepted by a claimant is a
full and final settlement against all Facility
members. 28

V. Criticisms
As with any legal innovation, the Asbestos Claims Facility has come under a great
deal of scrutiny and criticism. Ronald L.
Motley, a partner in Blatt & Fales, a South
Carolina law firm which represents over

5,000 asbestos claims nationwide, has
taken exception to certain parts of the
Wellington Agreement. He points out that
the terms of the agreement by which a
claimant must abide, strongly reflect the
lack of involvement of victims and their
representatives in the negotiations that resulted in the establishment of the Facility.
Mr. Motley has stated that those parts of
the agreement that stipulate no punitive
damage settlements, payment only for
physical impairment and dysfunction, and
all defendants settle or none, "looks like a
Manville wish list." 29

It has become
readily apparent that
the United States
court system is
ill-equipped to
effectively resolve
. . . the massive
amounts of asbestos
litigation.

Motley's criticisms are shared by many
who are representing the claimants' interests. It is only natural for adversary parties
to be suspicious of one another, but many
plaintiffs' attorneys feel they have just reason to be wary of the Asbestos Claims Facility. They readily point out that the
Wellington Agreement is a method of dispute resolution devised by and for the defendant asbestos producers. Some plaintiffs' counsel have expressed great concern
over the fact that claimant representatives
were only recently asked to partake in refining certain portioris of the claims process
and operation of the Facility. Proponents
of the Facility counter by claiming that it
was necessary for the defendant producers
and carriers to resolve their internal problems before they could present this concept
to potential claimants.
Other representatives of the claimants'
interests point out that certain actions and
omissions on behalf of the Facility have
amounted to acts of bad faith. As a case-inpoint, in Maine, stays of litigation have
been sought in 260 cases by local counsel
on behalf of Facility members. The intent

is obvious; if the stays are granted, the
claimants will find application to the Facility a much more appealing prospect.
The claimants will be put in a situation
whereby they will be willing to accept
drastically reduced amounts of compensation for a quicker resolution of the claimall at a great savings to the Facility members. The Facility's response to this charge
is only that they have not authorized any
blanket stays. Claimants and their representatives also point out the Facility's decision not to publicize the existence of the
Facility on a nationwide basis, and its unwillingness to incorporate into the body of
the Agreement a stipulation not to seek
legislative redress for the asbestos-injury
compensation problem. These omissions
are generally viewed as tactical decisions
by the members to minimize their potentialliability. However, some detractors of
the Facility allege that the omissions indicate the Facility'S unwillingness "to tell
you they are here and how long they are
going to be here."
Other criticisms of the Facility are directed at the terms of the Agreement itself.
While the Facility has acknowledged that
compensation of the claimants is based
upon a liability share assigned to each
member by independent analysis, the Facility has refused to divulge to the claimants
exactly what percentage of liability is assigned to each member. This factor is increasingly relevant in light of the fact that
not all asbestos producers and their insurers are members of the Facility. Most notably, Johns-Manville, who was generally
regarded as the world's leading asbestos
producer, is not a member of the Facility.
The evaluation of Manville's percentage
ofliability by the Facility will be a significant factor in any settlement offer it may
provide. If the assessed share of liability
for Manville is significant, it will reduce
any offer made by the Facility proportionately to Manville's perceived share. It
should be noted that Johns-Manville is a
conditional member of the facility and is
awaiting disposition of its Chapter 11 reorganization request. An open-ended question in regard to this matter is whether,
during the course of negotiations between
the claimant and the Facility, the Facility
will disclose its evaluation of the plaintiff's
case at 100% of worth, the percentage of
the Facility member's liability share relative to that 100% evaluation, the names of
non-member manufacturers who the facility has determined to have contributed to
the plaintiff's injuries, and the percentage
of liability attributed to each such manufacturer.
There is also some concern as to the theory of insurance coverage utilized by the
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Facility. Once policy limits are exhausted,
the duty to compensate the claimant falls
on the manufacturer. Some claimant representatives feel that this could lead to a
rash of bankruptcy petitions being filed by
manufacturers in order to avoid paying the
compensation. Proponents of the Facility
note that the so-called "triple trigger" theory is more than equitable. They readily
point to the member insurer's willingness
to cover, on a pro-rata basis, the gaps in insurance coverage caused by non-member
insurers of member manufacturers. Critics
reply by stating that the so-called "gap
coverage" also applies against the insurer's
total policy liability, thereby, accelerating
the insurer's departure from the Facility.
One final prevalent criticism of the Facility is that it has created a vehicle by
which asbestos victims will be enticed by
easily obtainable but low cash-amount settlements. The theoretical argument is that,
by accepting the anticipated low cash settlements, the claimants are denying themselves the opportunity to make themselves
"whole" as would exist under general tort
theory. Proponents of the Facility counter
by noting the voluntary nature of the Facility and that, if settlement offers are too
low, nobody would utilize the Facility.

VI. Conclusion
The uniqueness of the Asbestos Claims
Facility lies in the fact that it is a private
sector attempt to resolve a basically legal
issue. The members are not asking the
courts or Congress to bail the industry out
of its own responsibilities. This is certainly
commendable in light of past developments
in the automobile and transportation industry. The members hope that it will be
an alternative to the judicial process that is
attractive enough to the injured parties that
they will select the Facility over the costly
and time consuming litigation process.
Undoubtedly, the Facility will provide
savings for its members through cost reduction and spending containment. However, the purpose of the Facility should not
be limited to expediting the needs of its
members. The success of this concept rests
largely on the willingness of the members
to settle on legitimate claims and to settle
at an amount satisfactory to both the plaintiff and the Facility member. Without a
fair settlement procedure, plaintiffs will
bypass the Facility and proceed directly to
the courts. Obviously, it is in the Facility's
best interest to properly compensate the
claimants. Failure to do so will ultimately
result in the failure of the Facility.
Should the Asbestos Claims Facility
prove to be successful, its future implications could be immense. A standard will
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be set by which private industry may come
to be expected to provide remedies for
its own wrongs. Its effect on the judicial
system will be just as telling. A workable
method by which substantial amounts of
similar-type litigation can be resolved could
dramatically reduce the case load of an
already overburdened trial system. Of
course, the Facility is still in its infancy; its
potential is immense but the possibility of
failure is just as great. Its fate is predicated
upon the willingness of both sides of the
adversary process to communicate and
mediate their differences. While there is
nothing new about this formula, the Asbestos Claims Facility is certainly a radical
departure offorum in which the formula is
to be tested.

VII.

~eDnbership

AC&S, Inc.
Aetna Life & Casualty Co.
American Universal Insurance Group
Armstrong World Industries, Inc.
Bituminous Casualty Corp.
Carey Canada, Inc.
The Celotex Corporation
Certain Teed Corp.
C.E. Thurston & Sons, Inc.
CIGNA Property and Casualty
Insurance Cos.
Continental Corp.
Crum & Forster
Dana Corp.
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.
Employers Insurance of Wausau
Fibreboard Corporation
Fireman's Fund, Inc.
First State Insurance Co.
Flexitallic Gasket Co., Inc.
The Flintkote Co.
Genstar Corp.
Harbor Insurance Co.
Hartford Insurance Group
H.K. Porter Company, Inc.
Hopeman Brothers, Inc.
Keene Corp.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
Lloyd's of London
Maremont Corp.
National Gypsum Co.
Nosroc Corp.
Nuclear & Environmental Protection, Inc.
Nulturn Corp.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Ownes-Illinois, Inc.
Pittsburgh-Corning Corp.
Reliance Insurance Co.
Rock Wool Manufacturing Co.
Royal Insurance Co.
Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co.
Thorpe Insulations
Turner & Newall PLC
Unijax

U.S. Gypsum
Zurich-American Insurance Companies
Confidential (5)

VIII. Further InforDnation
For additional information regarding the
Asbestos Claims Facility, please contact
Carolyn C. Tieger at (202) 833-8550.
Ms. Tieger is a representative of BursonMarsteller, a Washington, D.C. public relations firm. Her address is: International
Square, 1825 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 950,
Washington, D.C. 20006-5498.
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